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L Introduction
In April 2006, the Washington Post uncovered a secret agreement between the
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Air Force, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other federal agencies to withdraw and reclassify
records from NARA's publicly accessible shelves.2 This reclassification program
was disclosed by an amateur historian whose "requests for formerly available
documents were delayed or denied. 3  After another secret reclassification
agreement was discovered, the Archivist of the United States announced that he was
discontinuing all secret reclassification projects within NARA.4
Later that April, the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), a
branch of NARA, released a report that attempted to quantify and, as much as
practicable, describe the records affected by the program of secret withdrawals. 5
1. MARcus VALERIUS MARTIAuS, EPIGRAMMATA 102 (W.M. Lindsay ed., Oxford
University Press 1922) ("[Q]uod tegitur, maius creditur esse malum.").
2. See Christopher Lee, Archives Kept a Secrecy Secret: Agencies RemovedDeclassified
Papers from Public Access, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2006, at A6 (reporting the existence of the
secret agreement); see also Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the National
Archives and Records Administration and the United States Air Force (Mar. 7, 2002),
http://www.archives.gov/declassification/mou-nara-usaf.pdf (providing the text of the
agreement).
3. Christopher Lee, Archives Pledges to End Secret Agreements, WASH. POST, Apr. 18,
2006, at A4.
4. See id. (quoting the statement of the ISOO's director).
5. See generally INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, AUDIT REPORT: WITHDRAWAL OF
RECORDS FROM PUBLIC ACCESS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION FOR
CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES (2006), http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2006-audit-report.pdf
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The ISOO auditors found that at least 25,315 publicly available records had
been withdrawn 6 and concluded that over a third of the withdrawn records did
not clearly meet the executive branch's standards for reclassification.7 Their
report illuminates a program of tremendous reach; for instance, the auditors
write:
[A] significant number of records that were withdrawn had actually been
created as unclassified documents but were subsequently classified by CIA
at the time of re-review (often 50 years later) solely because they contained
the name of a CIA official in the list of individuals provided a copy.
8
The report goes on to describe the minimalist limiting principle which informed
the agencies' reclassification activities:
Based upon review of withdrawn records as well as interviews with
concerned personnel, it is apparent that records were often withdrawn
because the agency can continue classification of a specific record, with
infrequent consideration as to whether classification should be continued.9
It seems reasonable to conclude from the foregoing that, having been given the
opportunity, government agencies involved in intelligence and defense
clandestinely, liberally, and aggressively pursued the reclassification of public
documents. °
At the time the first agreement was signed on March 7, 2002, the handling
of classified information was governed by a Clinton-era policy directive-
Executive Order 12,958, which prohibited the practice of reclassification-
directing that "[i]nformation may not be reclassified after it has been
declassified and released to the public under proper authority."" In March
2003, just over a year later, the George W. Bush Administration (Bush
Administration) amended Executive Order 12,958 to effectively reverse the
above prohibition. The amended executive order provided:
[hereinafter AUDIT REPORT].
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. (finding that 24% of withdrawn records "were clearly inappropriate for continued
classification" and 12% "were questionable").
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at20.
10. See id. at 2 ("NARA has not had the necessary resources available to keep up with the
agencies' re-review activity .... The most significant deficiency identified by this audit,
however, was the absence of standards, including requisite levels of transparency, governing
agency re-review activity .... ).
11. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, 19,829 § 1.8(c) (Apr. 17, 1995)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Original Order].
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Information may be reclassified after declassification and release to the
public under proper authority only in accordance with the following
conditions:
(1) the reclassification is taken under the personal authority of the
agency head or deputy agency head, who determines in writing
that the reclassification of the information is necessary in the
interest of the national security;
(2) the information may be reasonably recovered; and
(3) the reclassification action is reported promptly to the Director of
the Information Security Oversight Office.'
2
This reclassification authority is apparently novel and untested. 3 While the
first and third conditions of the amended provision recite relatively
straightforward procedural safeguards restricting reclassification, the second
condition describes a substantive-and substantially ambiguous-standard.14
As of this writing, the phrase "reasonably recovered" does not appear, except as
a direct reference to the Amended Order, in the U.S. Code, the Code of Federal
Regulations, or the Federal Register. It is an entirely novel standard in federal
law. As such, the constitutional significance of the reasonably recovered
provision is largely an open question, which the Executive and Judicial
branches will have a role in answering. This Note will attempt to predict the
likely contours of that answer.
Determining the force and meaning of the reasonably recovered standard
requires a basic understanding of (a) the Executive Branch's own interpretation
of the standard, as revealed by its public statements and actions; (b) the
importance of classified information to the national security of the United
States and the legal tools in place to protect that information; (c) the overall
inclination of the courts to delve into national security issues; and (d) the
meaning courts have ascribed to reasonableness standards in other national
security matters. To that end, Part II of this Note will examine the regulations
12. Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315, 15,318 § 1.7(c) (Mar. 25, 2003)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Amended Order].
13. See AUDIT REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that, "[S]ince the March 2003
amendment to the Order and prior to the onset of this audit, no agency had reported to the ISOO
any reclassification action under this provision," and further explaining, in a footnote, that a
single such action had subsequently been reported and was under review); see also infra Part
II.A (discussing the implications of the limited record of reclassification).
14. See Amended Order, supra note 12, for the text of the conditions.
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promulgated under the reclassification authority of the Amended Order and
review documented reclassification actions. Part III will provide background
on the classification program, its theoretical justifications, its operating
structure, and the legislature's parallel enforcement mechanism. Part IV will
argue that the judicial tradition of deference to the political branches in national
security matters has declined to the point of irrelevance in modem
jurisprudence, and judicial deference is therefore unlikely to shield
reclassification actions from constitutional scrutiny. Part V will examine how
constitutional scrutiny is likely to proceed, focusing on the confusing
construction of the concept of reasonableness in Fourth Amendment and First
Amendment cases relating to national security. That examination will
illuminate the multitude and diversity of exceptions to First and Fourth
Amendment doctrines afforded to the Executive in past national security cases;
these exceptions suggest that established constitutional law may fail to reliably
restrain reclassification activities. Part VI concludes that, if reclassification
authority ever comes into conflict with individual liberties, the authority will
largely survive the constitutional scrutiny that it is likely to endure.
II. Executive Interpretation of the Reach of Reclassification Authority
This Part briefly introduces and examines the Executive Branch's
interpretation of the reasonably recovered standard. Subpart A addresses the
dearth of documentation on the actual use of the reclassification authority,
which severely handicaps any pragmatic understanding of what the reasonably
recovered standard means. Subpart B seeks a theoretical understanding of the
reclassification standard by analyzing the ISOO's official guidance on its
meaning.
A. The Limited Record ofReclassification Actions
This subpart demonstrates that the limited public record of actual
applications of the reasonably recovered standard precludes a pragmatic
understanding of the standard's meaning. Between March 2003 and April
2006, when the ISOO began its investigation of the withdrawal of records from
NARA's shelves, no reclassification actions had been reported to the ISOO as
required by the Amended Order.15 Since the ISOO began its investigation, only
15. See AUDIT REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 ("It should be noted that since the March 2003
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one such report has been publicly acknowledged (about which detailed
information does not seem to be available).16 Publicly available records of the
use of the reclassification authority, therefore, lack credibility as a guide to
understanding the Amended Order's reclassification standards. The uses of the
authority about which we have detailed information-the withdrawal of records
from NARA' 7-- did not comply with the Amended Order in at least one
significant respect: The uses were not reported as required.18 Those uses,
therefore, do not provide trustworthy guidance of how the government
interprets the standards of the Amended Order.' 9 The single instance of
compliance with the Amended Order,20 which might provide some insight into
the meaning of reasonably recovered, is not documented in sufficient detail to
draw any conclusion. Any understanding of what the Executive means by its
reasonably recovered standard therefore will have to remain somewhat
theoretical-drawn not from actual use but rather from the best available
source, public statements explaining the standard's meaning.
B. ISO0 Guidance on the Reasonably Recovered Standard
The official guidance on the meaning of the reasonably recovered standard
provides negligible restraints on government action. The ISOO offered its
definition of "reasonably recoverable" in 2003:
In making the decision to reclassify information that has been declassified
and released to the public under proper authority, .... the agency must deem
the information to be reasonably recoverable which means that:
amendment to the Order and prior to the onset of this audit, no agency has reported to ISOO any
reclassification action under this provision.").
16. See id. at 5 n.2 (acknowledging one instance had been reported and was under
review).
17. See generally id. (referring apparently to the withdrawal of records from NARA).
18. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,318 (directing that all agencies report
reclassification actions to the ISOO promptly).
19. See AUDIT REPORT, supra note 5, at 6-12 (describing how many of the records
withdrawn from NARA did not meet the Amended Order's standards). Nevertheless, the
investigation of the withdrawals from NARA shows that government agencies have engaged in
aggressive reclassification when given the opportunity. See supra note 10 and accompanying
text (evaluating the government's conduct based on the evidence in the AUDIT REPORT).
20. See AUDIT REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 n.2 (mentioning the single report of a
reclassification that the ISOO has received).
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(1) Most individual recipients or holders are known and can be
contacted and all forms of the information to be reclassified can
be retrieved from them and
(2) If the information has been made available to the public via
means such as Government archives or reading rooms, it is
withdrawn from public access.
21
This pragmatic definition lacks any sense of prudential or constitutional
limitation on the government's reclassification authority. Further, the purely
procedural limitation found in the two elements of the definition does not place
much of a check on government conduct. Indeed, the second element
seemingly does not present a limiting condition at all. The withdrawal of
information from publicly accessible archives is an aim of reclassification, not a
limitation upon it. Thus, the only limitation on the reclassification authority the
ISOO's definition contemplates is in the first element, which merely requires
that a majority ("most") of the individuals who have the information be within
the government's reach.22
Neither the Amended Order nor the ISOO's definition explicitly prohibit
(or explicitly approve) the newfound reclassification authority from operating
outside the walls of the government and, ultimately, affecting private citizens.
Moreover, a close reading of the Amended Order and the ISOO's definition
supports the view that the reclassification authority is intended to reach
members of the public at large. The Amended Order specifically authorizes the
recovery of information "after declassification and release to the public.
z" 2 3
Further, the ISOO's definition specifically contemplates the recovery of
information from "individual recipients and holders," as distinct from
21. 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13 (2006); accord 68 Fed. Reg. 55,168, 55,170 (Sept. 22, 2003).
22. See 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13 (stating the requirement).
23. Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,318 (emphasis added); see also discussion infra
Part III.A.2 (concluding that the standards for an original classification do not necessarily apply
to reclassification). The discussion in Part III.A.2 may serve to answer one potential objection
to the analysis in this paragraph: One might contend that reclassification authority cannot reach
the public at large because information may only be originally classified if it is "owned by,
produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States government." Amended Order,
supra note 12, at 15,315. There are two responses to this objection. The first is that although a
given piece of information subject to reclassification is no longer "under the control of the
United States government," it likely will have been "produced by or for" the government and
still may be "owned by" the government. Id. Most information, therefore, will remain
classifiable even when it has left government possession. The second response is the claim
supported infra that many of the standards for an original classification exist in tension with the
reclassification authority and may not apply, therefore, to reclassifications.
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withdrawal of information from "[g]overnment archives and reading rooms."
2 4
In short, one might suppose from the ISOO's definition that any datum that the
government could sequester from a majority of its holders was a proper and a
reasonable subject for reclassification.
Such an extensive power, if utilized, is likely to conflict with the
constitutional rights of citizens.25 In the event that reclassification authority is
used to the full extent seemingly tolerated by the Executive Branch's official
guidance, the affected citizens will likely ask the Judicial Branch to explain
how the reclassification authority is limited by the constitutional rights of
citizens. The remainder of this Note will provide extensive background on the
classified information system and, subsequently, focus on the Judiciary's likely
interpretation of reclassification authority.
I1. The Handling of Classified Information in the United States
As a means to understand how the Judiciary will address the government's
newfound reclassification authority, this Part provides some context on the
classification program in general. Subpart A briefly introduces official
justifications for classifying information. Subpart B describes the structure and
limitations of the classification system. Finally, subpart C examines the
statutory enforcement mechanism for unauthorized disclosures.
A. Justification
The motivating concern of the classification program has always been the
potential for "damage to the national security" that would flow from the
disclosure of certain information. The stable definitions of each of the three
classification levels demonstrate the centrality of the government's concern for
national security:
(1) "Top Secret" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security that the original classification authority is
able to identify or describe.
24. 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13 (emphasis added).
25. See infra Part V (examining how recoveries of information for reclassification are
likely to impact First and Fourth Amendment rights).
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(2) "Secret" shall be applied to information, the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause
serious damage to the national security that the original
classification authority is able to identify or describe.
(3) "Confidential" shall be applied to information, the
unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause damage to the national security that the
original classification authority is able to identify or
describe.26
The potential for damage to the national security that attaches to a given piece
of information both animates the need for secrecy and indicates how closely it
should be held.27
Despite the permanence of the concern for national security, the official
justification for classifying information tends to shift in harmony with the
sitting President's foreign policy focus and rhetorical predisposition.28 For
instance, consider the justifying language in the preamble to the Clinton
Administration's Original Order, which explains:
[T]hroughout our history, the national interest has required that certain
information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens,
our democratic institutions, and our participation within the community of
nations.
29
As revised in the Bush Administration's Amended Order, that sentence reads:
[T]hroughout our history, the national defense has required that certain
information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens,
our democratic institutions, our homeland security, and our interactions
with foreign nations.30
The Original Order's conception of advancing the national interest through
tactful participation in a community of nations is replaced, in the Amended
26. Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,315-16 (emphasis added); accord Original
Order, supra note 11, at 19,826.
27. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,315-16, 15,324-27 (defining the
classification levels and describing the measures taken to safeguard classified information).
28. Compare Original Order, supra note 11, at 19,825 (detailing the Clinton
Administration's approach) with Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,315 (detailing the Bush
Administration's approach).
29. Original Order, supra note 11, at 19,825 (emphasis added).
30. Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,315 (emphasis added).
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Order, with an emphasis on maintaining security through secrecy in a series of
discrete interactions with individual nations.
B. Structure and Limitations
Whatever the justification, the somewhat abstract concern for national
security gives rise to a classification system that is governed by significant
procedural and substantive safeguards. These safeguards can be further divided
into those mandates that govern access to classified information (protecting the
integrity and secrecy of the information itself) and those that limit authority to
classify information (protecting the system from abuse).31 The former
safeguards address who can view classified information and how it must be
stored and handled.32 The latter safeguards, which will be the focus of the
discussion herein, address the introduction of a piece of information into the
classified system: Specifically, who may classify information at its first
appearance, what types of information may be classified, and what other
conditions must exist for a valid classification.33
1. Access
The government attempts to ensure the continued integrity of its secrets by
placing strict procedural safeguards on who can access classified information,
how that information may be accessed and shared, and how it is stored.34 The
safeguard which is perhaps most familiar to the public is the process of granting
security clearances-privileges to access classified information commonly held
by officials, government employees, contractors, etc.35 The security clearance
31. Compare Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,324-27 (restricting access to and
directing the handling of classified information), with id. at 15,315-19 (setting out the standards
of original classification). See also id. at 15,315 ("This order prescribes a uniform system for
classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information .... ").
32. See id. at 15,324-27 (restricting access to and directing the handling of classified
information); see also Exec. Order No. 13,381, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,953, 37,953 (June 27, 2005)
("Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National
Security Information.").
33. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,315-19 (setting out the standards for
original classification).
34. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Richard Willing, White House Looks for Faster Top-Secret Clearances,
USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-02-
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process takes place at the agency level and generally entails an extensive
background investigation.36 These vetted personnel will ultimately handle
information that is carefully isolated behind alarmed vault doors and in burglary
resistant safes 37 or can be accessed only through secure computer networks38 or
in hardened and well-defended facilities.39
2. Authority
The power to classify information in its first instance, "original
classification authority" (OCA), is subject to severe limitations. At the Top
Secret level, OCA can be received from the President, the Vice President, 40 an
agency head, or an official whom the President designates in the Federal
Register.4 OCA for Secret and Confidential information may also be delegated
14-top-secret-clearances x.htm (documenting a proposal to expedite the process of granting
security clearances in order to fill vacant jobs at government agencies and defense contractors)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See id. at 15,324 ("A person may have access to classified information provided
that... a favorable determination of eligibility for access has been made by an agency head or
the agency head's designee ....").
37. See GENERAL SERVS. ADMIN., SCHEDULE 71-III-E (2007), available at http://
www.gsaelibrary.gsa.gov/ElibMain/ScheduleSummary?scheduleNumber=71 +III+E#FSS_71
III E (listing, among other things, storage containers and vault doors approved for the storage
of classified information).
38. See A. Denis Clift, Intelligence in the Internet Era: From Semaphore to Predator, 47
STUD. INTELLIGENCE No. 3, article 6 (2003), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-
the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol47no3/article6.htm (last
visited Sept. 5, 2007) (describing the evolution of rapid, secure communication of intelligence
information and the networks currently in use) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The networks currently in use are the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET), for Secret or less sensitive information, and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communication System (JWICS), for Top Secret information. Id.
39. See Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room, Physical Security
Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, http://www.foia.cia.gov/
search.asp (search for "SCIF"; then follow "Physical Security Standards For Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 5, 2007) (directing
standards for the construction, maintenance and defense of Secure Compartmented Information
Facilities (SCIF), which are used for the handling and storage of highly classified information)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. Compare Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,316 (conferring a novel power-to
delegate original classification authority-upon the Vice President in the exercise of his
executive duties), with Original Order, supra note 11, at 19,827 (doing no such thing).
41. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,316 (defining who may classify information
originally).
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by a senior agency official who has Top Secret OCA and administers a "Special
Access Program. '42  In this respect, OCA is similar to reclassification, a
relatively small number of high ranking officials-agency heads and their
deputies-wield the authority to reclassify information.4 By contrast, a much
larger subset of officials hold "derivative classification authority. "44
The relatively small number of officials to whom OCA is delegated is
further limited by substantive standards; OCA only applies to information that
relates to:
a. military plans, weapons systems, or operations;
b. foreign government information;
c. intelligence activities (including special activities),
intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
d. foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States,
including confidential sources;
e. scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the
national security, which includes defense against
transnational terrorism;
f. United States Government programs for safeguarding
nuclear materials or facilities;
g. vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations,
infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services
relating to the national security, which includes defense
against transnational terrorism; or
42. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,316 (granting classification authority); see
also id. at 15,333 (defining "Special Access Program" as an initiative that safeguards a specific
class of classified information, presumably highly sensitive, by imposing special access and
handling requirements).
43. See id. at 15,318 (directing that reclassifications must take place under the personal
authority of an agency head or deputy agency head).
44. See id. at 15,319 (regulating the use of derivative classification). Derivative
classification can be used by anyone who reproduces, analyzes, extracts, or summarizes
information that has already been classified. Id. A classification level is applied to the work
product of these officials according to detailed classification guides, which are promulgated by
an OCA. Id.
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h. weapons of mass destruction.45
Importantly, information to be classified must be in some way proprietary to the
U.S. government.46  Further, the official exercising OCA must be able to
identify the damage that disclosure of the subject information would do to
national security.
47
The Amended Order does not make clear which of the substantive
standards governing OCA, if any, would apply to reclassification authority.
Some of those standards appear to logically conflict with the reclassification
authority as it is framed. For instance, the specific authority granted by the
Amended Order to reclassify information "after declassification and release to
the public" 48 is in tension with the requirement that the classifying official
identify what damage to the national security would result from disclosure of
the subject information.49 By definition, a reclassification occurs after the
subject information has been publicly disclosed, when whatever damage its
disclosure will do is, in all probability, afait accompli. In any case, the only
problem the reclassification authority can address is the damage from continued
exposure, not disclosure. Requiring the reclassification authority to identify the
damage that would flow from the disclosure of already public information
seems counterintuitive at best. It is therefore reasonable to believe that
reclassifications may be evaluated under different standards than original
classifications.
C. Penalties for Unauthorized Disclosure of Sensitive Information
To understand the context in which the courts would approach disputes
arising from the reclassification authority, it is necessary to examine how
Congress has addressed disclosures of sensitive information. 50 As will be
45. Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,317.
46. See id. at 15,315 ("[T]he information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the
control of the United States government.").
47. See id. ("[T]he original classification authority determines that the unauthorized
disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national
security ... and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.").
48. Id. at 15,318.
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (setting forth the requirement, which is part
of the definition of each classification level).
50. See generally Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLuM. L. REv. 929 (1973) (discussing the legislative
enactment of the Espionage Act and related statutes). Edgar and Schmidt introduce their
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discussed in Part IV, the amount of deference the Executive branch receives in
a national security dispute is often connected to the amount of legislative
guidance available on the subject of the dispute. If a court is persuaded that a
certain area of conduct is the subject of a democratic consensus, it is less likely
to approve unilateral Executive action to limit that conduct. 5'
The foregoing principle will become especially important in subsequent
Parts because of the significant disparities in how Congress and the Executive
approach sensitive information. Specifically, Congress protects the majority of
sensitive information through its own definitions, in the Espionage Act 52 and
associated statutes, and not by recourse to the Executive's classification
scheme.53 Congress's approach renders irrelevant the classification (or
reclassification) status of a given piece of information in the majority of
disclosure prosecutions.5 4  Further, Congress has provided most criminal
penalties only for disclosures with the specific intent (or reason to believe) that
the disclosed information will be used to harm the United States or its agents-
a definition that apparently excludes most politically motivated or inadvertent
leaks.55 This narrow definition of criminal intent tends to limit the frequency of
disclosure prosecutions.56
examination with a note of caution that bears repetition:
When we turned to the United States Code to find out what Congress had done, we
became absorbed in the effort to comprehend what the current espionage statutes
mandate with respect to the communication and publication of defense information.
The longer we looked, the less we saw. Either advancing myopia had taken its toll,
or the statutes implacably resist the effort to understand. In any event, whether the
mote be in our eye or in the eyes of the draftsmen, we have not found it possible to
deal with the espionage statutes except at forbidding length.
Id. at 929.
51. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to prevent the publication
of leaked, classified information in a controversial decision during the Vietnam War).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000).
53. See infra notes 57-69 (describing the structure of the Espionage Act and associated
statutes which criminalize disclosures of sensitive information); see also supra Part II.A-B
(describing the structure of the classified system under the Amended Order).
54. See United States v. Safford, 40 C.M.R. 528,532 (A.B.R. 1969) ("[l]nformation need
not be 'classified' to constitute [disclosures of that information as] offenses under the Espionage
Act."); see also Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 25-27 (1941) (determining whether the
Espionage Act protects a piece of information by reference to the language of the Espionage Act
itself).
55. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (describing the nature of the intent
requirement).
56. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) ("It is
unquestionably true that the prosecutions generally under the Espionage Act... have not been
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Federal law, through the Espionage Act and related statutes, protects
sensitive information in a manner that is largely independent from the
Executive's classification system. 57 Significantly, the disclosure statutes of title
18, chapter 37 of the U.S. Code frame the penalties for unauthorized disclosure
of sensitive information somewhat differently than the measures for protection
in the Executive Orders. 58 With limited exceptions, the disclosure statutes do
not require evidence of the disclosed information's classified status.59 Instead,
the statutes seek to encompass the whole body of classifiable information with
their own definitions, which rest primarily on the concept of "information
respecting the national defense.,
60
The "national defense" concept is absent, however, from 18 U.S.C. § 798,
which provides penalties for disclosing classified information related to
cryptography, 6' and from 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-26, the Intelligence Identities
great. This is understandable. Violations under the Act are not easily established."); see also
Mitchel J. Michalec, The Classified Information Protection Act: Killing the Messenger or
Killing the Message, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 455,467-77 (2003) (discussing the limited number
of prosecutions under the Espionage Act and associated statutes, as well as providing general
background on the judicial interpretation of those laws).
57. See, e.g., Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000) (criminalizing disclosures of
sensitive national defense information). The statute provides:
Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense
with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the
United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation... copies, takes, makes, or
obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance,
document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense ....
... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both.
Id.
58. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-98 (protecting information related to the national
defense).
59. Cf United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1988) (arguing that
the classified system does control one element of an Espionage Act offense-whether the person
to whom the information is communicated is "entitled to receive" that information). The
analysis of the Espionage Act in Morison suggests that Congress designed the law to rely on one
element of the classified system-the determination of which persons should have access to
sensitive information, supra Part Il.B. 1--but not to rely on another element-the determination
of which information is sensitive, supra Part III.B.2. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1065-66.
60. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (protecting information related to the national defense).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (criminalizing the disclosure of classified information related to
cryptography and signals intelligence); see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 1064
(discussing the relative clarity in the drafting of 18 U.S.C. § 798 compared to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 793-94). Edgar and Schmidt write: "Ambiguities do not cloud the relevance of section 798
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Protection Act, which makes it a crime for someone who has had access to
classified information to disclose the identity of a covert intelligence agent
under certain circumstances.62 These two provisions are the only ones that
make the classification status of the disclosed information an element of a
crime. 63 The classification, declassification, or reclassification of a given piece
of sensitive information would, therefore, be only directly relevant in
prosecutions under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act and for
prosecutions related to cryptography or those that signal intelligence
disclosures.
The narrowness of the intent requirements and strictness of the substantive
requirements of the disclosure laws significantly limit the scope of statutory
power to punish unauthorized disclosures. The legislative burden of protecting
information related to the national defense is, for the most part, carried by 18
U.S.C. § 793, which prescribes penalties of up to ten years in prison for
gathering, transmitting, or losing "information respecting the national defense
with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury
of the United States."64 More sinister disclosures are governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 794, which prescribes penalties up to and including death for activities
conducted with "intent or reason to believe that [the disclosed information] is to
to the coverage of the Espionage Act of 1917. This provision was enacted in 1950... to cover
cryptographic information, material surely at the heart of the 'related to the national defense'
conception." Id.
62. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-26 (2000) (criminalizing the disclosure of the identity of a
covert agent who had been posted overseas in the past five years by a person who has, or had,
access to classified information and knew that the government was attempting to keep the
agent's identity a secret).
63. See, e.g., Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 1065 ("[T]he inevitable vagueness in
defining what cryptographic information is subject to restriction is substantially mitigated,
although perhaps at the cost of overbreadth, by making classification an element of the
offense.").
64. 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2000); see also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 986 (discussing
the intent requirement). Edgar and Schmidt criticize the framing of the intent element:
[T]he espionage laws share the characteristic ills of federal criminal law that result
from the use of undefined and exceedingly complex culpability standards to
demarcate the boundaries of federal offenses.... That prosecutions have been
directed at clandestine transfer of information to foreign agents has led courts to
construe the culpability terms rather broadly. Because the courts have not had to
confront the culpability issues in the context of public speech, current judicial
constructions tend to aggravate the problems of plain meaning constructions.
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be used to the injury of the United States" or with intent to aid an enemy,
65
provided that the challenged activities
resulted in the identification by a foreign power... of an individual acting
as an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of that
individual, or directly concerned nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft or
satellites, early warning systems, or other means of defense or retaliation
against large-scale attack; war plans; communications intelligence or
cryptographic information; or any other major weapons system or major
element of defense strategy.
66
The specific intent requirements of the foregoing laws are not reflected in the
laws which rely on classified status, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act,
and 18 U.S.C. § 798; however, both laws have such narrow substantive focuses
and knowledge requirements that prosecution under their authority would be a
formidable challenge.67
In crafting this legislative scheme, Congress has mostly disregarded the
Executive's classification scheme and, seemingly, narrowed the focus of the
laws to the gravest of disclosures.6 8 In that sense, Congress has not endorsed a
broad governmental interest in preserving the integrity of the Executive's
classified system that is substantial enough to justify infringing the liberties of
individual citizens. Even though such protection of the classified system might
be justifiable by reference to the country's security, commentators Harold
Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. have identified why Congress chose not to do
so:
The countervailing consideration is, of course, the fact routinely accepted
in all quarters that the Executive Branch abuses the power of classification.
To give the Executive unreviewable power to invoke a prohibition on the
communications of everyone, even as to a relatively narrow category of
information, seems to be of doubtful wisdom.
69
Congress's choice not to broadly protect the classified program provides ample
reason to doubt that Congress would approve a wide-ranging reclassification
power for the Executive; this implicit lack of congressional support for the
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 794(a)-(b) (describing the intent element of the crime).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a).
67. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing the limits of the two laws).
68. See supra notes 49-50 (describing Congress's approach to disclosures of sensitive
information).
69. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 1066 (discussing the Executive's classification
power in the course of arguing that improper classification should be a defense to 18 U.S.C.
§ 798).
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reclassification program carries a great deal of significance for the analysis of
how the judiciary will approach reclassification.
IV. The Fading Tradition of Judicial Deference to the Executive and
Legislative Branches in National Security Affairs
This Part assesses the likelihood that federal courts will apply
constitutional scrutiny to the use of reclassification authority against individuals
by concurrently examining two related doctrines. First, the examination
focuses on traditional judicial deference to what has been described as the pure
executive authority to protect the national security and to conduct foreign
relations.70 Second, the analysis discusses judicial deference to congressionally
designed national security programs that the Executive administers. 71 This Part
concludes that, while the latter deference remains more respected in the courts,
both species of deference are in decline in the face of a mounting judicial
determination to impose constitutional discipline upon the President's national
security activities (at least to the extent that they impact individual liberties).
Federal courts may be asked to determine whether the Executive's
exercise of reclassification authority is consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States; whether the courts will resolve that question is
72uncertain. Before it reached the constitutionality of an executive
reclassification action, the judiciary would have an opportunity to avoid passing
judgment on the underlying issue by simply deferring to the Executive Branch
in its role as the guarantor of national security or by deferring to the joint
endeavors of the political branches (Executive and Legislative) in their role as
the bodies of government more directly accountable to the people.
The analysis of deference begins with the roundly criticized decision in
Korematsu v. United States.73 This case traces the decline of the deferential
principle by attempting to follow the progress and growing influence of an old
70. See infra notes 74, 78, 90, 110, 111, and accompanying text (providing examples of
this deferential description of Executive power).
71. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction of executive
power and congressional legislation).
72. Compare infra Part IV.A-C (describing judicial skepticism of executive power over
sensitive information disclosures), with infra Part V (describing judicial support of restricting
individual rights because of national security reasons).
73. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (ratifying the forced
relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry based on asserted military necessity).
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idea: In order for our democratic system to be preserved, each element must act
as a check on the Executive, even in times of great exigency.
A. Korematsu and Pentagon Papers
With its controversial ruling in Korematsu,4 the Supreme Court
articulated a categorical principle of wartime judicial deference to the
Executive Branch.75 In less infamous decisions, the Supreme Court
approvingly observed a similar principle: "[T]he generally accepted view that
foreign policy [is] the province and responsibility of the Executive. ',76 In
74. See id. (upholding an exclusion order for relocating persons of Japanese ancestry). In
Korematsu, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an American citizen's
criminal conviction for remaining in a military area where persons of Japanese ancestry had
been ordered excluded. Id. at 215-16. The citizen, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, was charged
with violation of Exclusion Order No. 34 for failing to leave his home and going to a designated
Assembly Center until taken by military escort to a Relocation Center for an indefinite period.
Id. at 222-23. After dispensing with preliminary matters, the Court considered Korematsu's
contention that the Exclusion Order amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty
without due process. Id. at 223. The Court summarily dismissed this contention as a confused
and mistaken statement of the issue. Id. The Court, instead, recognized that the case turned on
a military question and refused to apply retrospective disapproval to the military commanders'
apprehension that the West Coast of the United States might be invaded by the Empire of Japan
and their subsequent calculation that, because of the disloyalty of some citizens of Japanese
descent, the all-inclusive Exclusion Order was a necessary defensive measure. Id. at 223-24.
75. See id. at 223-24 (uncritically accepting the Executive Branch's assertions of military
necessity and ratifying the drastic curtailment of the civil rights of a single racial group). The
Court writes:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was
not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was
excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress,
reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it
must---determined that they should have the power to do just this. There was
evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered that
the need for action was great, and time was short. We cannot-by availing
ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at that time these
actions were unjustified.
Id.
76. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981); see also United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that "courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to
Presidential responsibilities" in his judgments respecting foreign policy and national security).
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another decision, the Justices wrote: "[U]nless Congress specifically has
provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the
authority of the Executive in military or national security affairs."77 The
following discussion argues that such deferential holdings have become
increasingly atypical.
Though Korematsu has never been explicitly overruled, the deferential
principle articulated therein-when it collides with the constitutional rights of
citizens-has since been honored mainly in the breach.78 The deliberate, if not
wholly unanimous, movement away from Korematsu's central holding is
illuminated by the deeply divergent opinions in New York Times Co. v. United
States (Pentagon Papers),79 a case which prompted all nine Justices to write
separately. Wholly absent from the per curiam holding and concurrences in
Pentagon Papers is any semblance of the distaste for second-guessing military
judgment that is so evident in the Korematsu majority opinion. Justice
Brennan's concurrence regards the urgency and gravity of the interests at stake
77. Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,530 (1988); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (refusing to allow military personnel to sue their superior officers for
damages on the basis of alleged constitutional violations); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
738, 757-58 (1975) (abstaining from reviewing a case until the military judicial process has
concluded); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 142-44 (1953) (deferring, in most cases, to the
decisions of the military justice system); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)
("[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up
channels through which such grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the
Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates.").
78. But see, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(holding that the President's power to conduct foreign relations is his alone, and further
declaring that the power to engage in sovereign interactions with other nations does not depend
on a constitutional provision). Curtiss-Wright provides an earlier example of a similarly
deferential posture. Id.
79. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971)
(rejecting, on First Amendment grounds, the government's attempt to prevent the publication of
a leaked, classified study of Vietnam war policy). In Pentagon Papers, the Supreme Court
considered whether an injunction sought by the government to prevent the New York Times and
Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified military document was consistent
with the First Amendment. Id. at 714. The government claimed the authority to suppress the
document in question-a study entitled History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam
Policy-on the grounds that (a) the publication of the study would endanger the national
security and (b) the President's authority as Commander-in-Chief and his authority to conduct
foreign affairs allowed him to protect the nation against such harm. Id. at 718 (Black, J.,
concurring). The Court, unimpressed with the Executive Branch's appeal for deference to its
wartime judgment, held that the government had not provided sufficient justification for its
actions to overcome the heavy presumption that any prior restraint of expression is
constitutionally invalid. Id. at 714.
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing in detail the Korematsu ruling).
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in Pentagon Papers as a contemptible, single-serving excuse for the interim
restraints on expression which allowed the case to reach the Supreme Court.8'
Further, Justice Black's concurrence regards any deference to the President's
inherent powers at the cost of individual liberties as constitutionally
repugnant. 82 The only hint of Korematsu-style deference appears in Justice
Harlan's dissent, which advocates limits on the scope of the Court's second-
guessing.83
81. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring) (criticizing the stays
on publication which preserved the matter for review as contrary to the First Amendment).
Justice Brennan writes:
The relative novelty of the questions presented, the necessary haste with which
decisions were reached, the magnitude of the interests asserted, and the fact that all
the parties have concentrated their arguments upon the question whether permanent
restraints were proper may have justified at least some of the restrains heretofore
imposed in these cases.... But even if it be assumed that some of the interim
restraints were proper in the two cases before us, that assumption has no bearing
upon the propriety of similar judicial action in the future.... [T]he First
Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in
circumstances of the kind presented in these cases.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that allowing the President to
restrain the publication of news for national security reasons is contrary to the intent of the
framers of the Constitution). Justice Black writes:
To find that the President [acting in the name of national security] has "inherent
power" to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts would wipe out the
First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very
people the Government hopes to make "secure"... . [I]t was injunctions like those
sought here that [James] Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this
Nation for all time.
Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he judiciary may not properly...
redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security."). Harlan
argues that such issues were "within the proper compass of the President's foreign relations
power." Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Peter D. Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of
the Pentagon Papers, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 3, 27-28 (1972) (analyzing Justice Harlan's
dissent). Junger writes:
Justice Harlan seems... to raise but not answer an extremely important question:
by what test can one locate the "proper compass of the President's foreign relations
power"? It would seem that one could not merely decide that any action having a
major influence on foreign affairs is within the compass, otherwise the President
could simply line the editors of the New York Times up against a wall and shoot
them. Obviously the nature of the action must also be considered. Shooting
citizens without trial within the territorial limits of the Unites States, however much
it might benefit our foreign relations, is, I hope, not within anyone's concept of the
President's foreign relations power.
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The reasoning adopted in the majority Justices' concurrences suggests that
the government can expect minimal deference for its unilateral reclassification
power. Pentagon Papers resolves a clearly apposite question: How far may
the Executive's power reach to exert control over secret information that has
made its way into the public eye? 84  The majority concurrences look to
Congress to determine the scope of Executive power and the degree of the
Court's deference.85 For instance, Justice Marshall writes:
[The Court is] not faced with a situation where Congress has failed to
provide the Executive with broad power to protect the nation from
disclosure of damaging state secrets. Congress has on several occasions
given extensive consideration to the problem of protecting the military and
strategic secrets of the United States. This consideration has resulted in the
enactment of statutes making it a crime to receive, disclose, communicate,
withhold, and publish certain documents, photographs, instruments,
appliances, and information.
8 6
In other words, the Government failed to persuade Justice Marshall that
Congress's laws criminalizing disclosure were insufficient to remedy the
substance of the claim against the newspapers. 87 Noticing the majority's
emphasis on congressional authorization, commentators Harold Edgar and
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., drew a persuasive analogy between Pentagon Papers
and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.88 Edgar and Schmidt write: "All
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the Government's attempt to
obtain an injunction preventing newspapers from publishing a classified study which had been
leaked).
85. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 931 (interpreting the majority opinions in the
Pentagon Papers as reflecting the Justices' hesitation to act without legislative guidance).
Edgar and Schmidt write:
The central theme sounded in the opinions of the six majority Justices was
reluctance to act in such difficult premises without guidance from Congress. That
reluctance necessarily lost the case for the Government, which argued that, without
regard to legislation, the President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief
and foreign relations steward entitled him to injunctive relief to prevent "grave and
irreparable danger" to the public interest.
Id.
86. N.Y. Times Co., v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring); see also supra Part III.C (describing the laws Congress has passed to
protect state secrets).
87. See Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. at 744-45 ("If the Government had attempted to show
that there was no effective remedy under traditional criminal law, it would have had to show that
there is no arguably applicable statute.").
88. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637-38 (1952) (denying
the President's authority to seize the nation's steel mills to mitigate the consequences of a labor
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the Justices concurring with the judgment [in Pentagon Papers] ... stressed the
Government's failure to premise its case on legislative authority. Thus the
Supreme Court's decision resembles in result a similar failure for unadorned
claims of executive power in Youngstown Steel. '"8 9 The principle asserted by the
majority in Pentagon Papers is the same principle Justice Jackson introduced in
his influential Youngstown concurrence: Actions by the Executive that serve the
purposes of existing law but operate outside its ambit threaten the constitutional
balance of power and therefore deserve vigilant scrutiny from the Court.90 This
dispute). In Youngstown, the Court reviewed President Truman's Executive Order No. 10,340
that directed the military to take control of most of the nation's steel mills. Id. at 582.
Truman's decision was prompted by the threat of a general strike by the United Steelworkers of
America, C.I.O, because of an intractable labor dispute. Id. The Court considered whether the
President had the power to issue his order in the absence of an explicit grant of authority from
Congress. Id. at 585. Finding no congressional authority for the President's action, the Court
reasoned that the only possible source of authority to close the steel mills was the Constitution.
Id. at 587. Finding no basis for the President's asserted authority in his constitutional, military,
or executive powers, the Court concluded that the President had acted without authority and
affirmed the lower courts in vacating his order. Id. at 587-89. In a widely noted concurrence,
Justice Jackson laid out a three-tiered structure for examining presidential authority:
(1) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate....
(2) When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain....
(3) When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.
Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
89. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 932. See also Junger, supra note 83, at 18-28
(discussing the analogy of Pentagon Papers with Youngstown and its meaning for executive
power). Junger writes:
[T]he strongest memory recalled to my mind when I first read the opinions in New
York Times [i.e. Pentagon Papers] was Youngstown.... The haste with which the
opinions in New York Times were produced led inevitably to a certain obscurity of
expression, but each cryptic sentence in New York Times evoked entire paragraphs
from the opinions in Youngstown. It was almost as if the Supreme Court had set
out, like some poet in the Arabian Nights, to extemporize the same song twice
using completely different words and meters.
Id. at 18.
90. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Courts can sustain
exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be
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line of reasoning indicates that the Executive can expect minimal deference to
reclassification activities because the protection of sensitive national security
information is the subject of robust legislation.9' Further, because those
disclosure laws do not, except for specialized exceptions, depend on the
classification status of a particular piece of information for their effectiveness, 92 it
appears unlikely that a court would consider the Executive's exercise of a
prerogative to reclassify as a particularly compelling occasion to defer.
B. Mitchell v. Forsyth
Mitchell v. Forsyth,93 a wiretapping case, is another example of the Court's
increasing discomfort with the Korematsu principle of deference to the Executive
scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system."). Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (holding
that the President's power to conduct external relations is his sovereign prerogative and not a
lawmaking power). The power to keep information secret undeniably aids the President's
conduct of external sovereignty, which Curtiss-Wright shields from constitutional challenge.
See id. ("[T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did
not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."). Nevertheless, the power to
classify information, in practice, has such a strongly domestic character that it seems unlikely to
fall under Curtiss-Wright's protection, which does not extend to internal affairs. See id at 315-
16 (presenting an important distinction between when Congress acts to regulate internal affairs
and when it acts to affect an external situation).
91. See supra Part III.C (describing the provisions of federal law that protect information
related to the national defense and other sensitive information).
92. See supra Part III.C (noting that the only offenses which depend on classification
status relate to the disclosure of information involving cryptography, signals intelligence, and
the identity of a covert operative).
93. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 536 (1985) (dismissing the Attorney General's
claim to absolute immunity from suit in matters concerning national security but granting him
qualified immunity). In Mitchell, the court considered three issues:
[W]hether the Attorney General [of the United States was] absolutely immune from
suit for actions undertaken in the interest of national security; if not, whether the
District Court's finding that the petitioner is not immune from suit for his actions
under the qualified immunity standard.., is appealable, and, if so, whether the
District Court's ruling on qualified immunity was correct.
Id. at 513 (citations omitted). In 1970, the FBI uncovered plots by members of an antiwar
group to blow up heating tunnels linking federal buildings in Washington, D.C. and to kidnap
National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. Id. On the basis of this information, Attorney
General John Mitchell approved a warrantless wiretap on the phone line of William Davidon, a
college professor and member of the group. Id. As a product of this wiretap, the government
intercepted three apparently innocuous conversations between Professor Davidon and Keith
Forsyth. Id. After discovering the existence of the wiretap, Mr. Forsyth sued former Attorney
General Mitchell for violating the Fourth Amendment and applicable law. Id. at 513-15. There
1138
JUST WHEN I THOUGHT I WAS OUT, THEY PULL ME BACK IN 1139
Branch in national security MatterS'.94 In this case, the Supreme Court rejected the
Attorney General's asserted absolute immunity from suit.95 Whereas Pentagon
Papers rejected the principle of deference to the Executive in the context of the First
Amendment 96 Mitchell rejects it in the context of the Fourth Amendment. 97
In order to approach the Court's holding in Mitchell, it is necessary to understand
the Court's previous holdings on the privileges enjoyed by high government officials.
Certain officials-because of their special functions or constitutional status--are
entitled to absolute immunity from lawsuits for damages arising from their official
actions.98 Within the Executive Branch, those entitled to absolute immunity include
prosecutors, executive officers engaged in adjudicative functions, and the President of
the United States.99 The majority of executive officials, by contrast, are only entitled to
qualified, good-faith immunity;' 00 a judicial finding of bad faith will eviscerate their
immunity defense.' 0'
Nevertheless, in defending against Fourth Amendment claims premised on a
warrantless wiretap, Attorney General Mitchell claimed absolute immunity, not
qualified immunity, for actions taken in furtherance of his national security
being no dispute that the warrantless domestic wiretap violated the Fourth Amendment, the only
genuine constitutional dispute on appeal to the Supreme Court was the extent of the immunity to
which Mitchell was entitled in national security matters. Id. at 516. Finding no common law
basis for granting absolute immunity to a Cabinet Officer's "national security function," the
Court weighed the risk that actual abuses would go uncovered against the countervailing risks
that "fancied abuses will give rise to unfounded and burdensome litigation" and that the threat
of personal liability would chill administration officials in the performance of their duties. Id. at
522. Finding the latter risks unpersuasive compared to the former, the Court held that no
absolute immunity should apply to the Attorney General's national security conduct. Id. at 523.
However, the court was sufficiently persuaded by the risk of "frivolous and vexatious" lawsuits
to grant the Attorney General qualified immunity in most circumstances. Id. at 524.
94. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 523 ("[B]uilt-in restraints on the Attorney General's
activities in the name of national security... do not exist. And despite our recognition of the
importance of those activities to the safety of our Nation and its democratic system of
government, we cannot accept the notion that restraints are completely unnecessary.").
95. Id. at 520.
96. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
97. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535-36.
98. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 510-11 (1975)
(recognizing an absolute immunity for congressmen and senators in the "legislative sphere").
99. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (cataloguing the officials in all
three branches who are entitled to absolute immunity).
100. See id. (discussing the nature of qualified immunity).
101. See id. (discussing the consequences of a finding of bad faith for officials with
qualified immunity).
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functions. 102 Because the Attorney General's national security functions do not relate
to any of his prosecutoial duties or any constitutional status, this argument could not
rely on traditional sources of absolute immunity, instead, the only plausible basis for
absolute immunity was the traditional deference afforded to the Executive in areas of
national security.10 3 Emphasizing the need to make officials accountable even when
protecting national security, the Court rejected any immunity based on traditional,
Korematsu-style deference:
[T]his is precisely the point... : "Where an official could be expected to know
that his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he shouldbe made
to hesitate.. . ." This is as true in matters of national security as in other fields of
governmental action. We do not believe that the security of the Republic will be
threatened if its Attorney General is given incentives to abide by clearly established
law.
1 °4
The issue of immunity from personal liability is a narrow one, and the facts in Mitchell
do not, of course, suggest any threat to national security on the scale of a feared
Japanese invasion of the West Coast.'° 5 Nevertheless, the Mitchell court was willing
to scrutinize national security arguments and to countenance lawsuits attaching
personal liability to officials who claim to be safeguarding national security;, such a
ruling can only cast doubt on the remaining persuasive power of deference to the
Executive in national security matters.
Considered together, the holdings in Pentagon Papers and Mitchell reflect a
Supreme Court that has embraced the enforcement of constitutional and legislative
discipline on the Executive's national security function. Since Korematsu, the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to delineate a purely executive area of national
security action that is beyond the power of the courts and Congress to jointly
102. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 516 (1985) (describing the claim to absolute
immunity).
103. See id. at 521 (deciding that the national security functions Mitchell was performing
were the only possible basis for his claim to absolute immunity). The majority wrote:
Mitchell's claim, then, must rest not on the Attorney General's position within the
Executive Branch, but on the nature of the functions he was performing in this case.
Because Mitchell was not acting in a prosecutorial capacity in this case, the
situations in which we have applied a functional approach to absolute immunity
questions provide scant support for blanket immunization of his performance of the
"national security function."
Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 524 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)).
105. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating the Court's reasoning in
Korematsu).
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restrain. 10 6 As will be shown in the following discussion of the Guantanamo Bay
detainee cases, the Court has recently gone even further, acting to enforce
constitutional challenges against the Executive despite Congress's attempts to restrain
the Court's jurisdiction.
C. Guantanamo Bay Detainee Cases
For the most recent evidence of the decline of judicial deference in matters
touching upon national security, this subpart examines the Supreme Court's
interventions in the Bush Administration's detention policies at Guantanamo Bay.
Between 2004 and 2006, the Supreme Court manifested its determination to discipline
the Executive Branch's activities at Guantanamo Bay in three cases which dealt with
the legality of the confinement and trial of detainees.
The issue of deference to the Executive is first addressed in Rasul v. Bush,' °7
which holds that foreign nationals imprisoned at Guantanamo possess the ability to
petition for habeas corpus in a U.S. district court. 0 Considering an argument for
deference to the Executive's detention, the Court finds its precedents persuasively
affirm its powers of review:
[T]his Court has recognized the federal courts' power to review applications for
habeas relief in a wide variety of cases involving executive detention, in wartime
as well as in times of peace. The Court has, for example, entertained the habeas
petitions of an American citizen who plotted an attack on military installations
during the Civil War, and of admitted enemy aliens convicted ofwar crimes during
a declared war and held in the United States [or] its insular possessions.
109
The Rasul opinion largely ignores, and therefore implicitly rejects, those precedents
which weigh in favor of deference to the Executive's approach to protecting national
106. See infra Parts IV.C, V.A (providing examples ofjudicial restrictions on Executive
actions regarding national security).
107. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,484 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas corpus
statute conferred on district courts the jurisdiction to hear challenges from aliens imprisoned at
Guantanamo Bay).
108. See id. at 473 ("Congress has granted federal district courts, within their respective
jurisdictions, the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to
be held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
(citations omitted)). The Court went on to hold that the Guantanamo Bay detainees and their
custodians were properly within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Id. at 484.
109. Id. at 474-75 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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security" 0 and conducting foreign relations."'
A more explicit rejection of Executive deference can be found in Rasu/'s
companion case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld:12  "Whatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake." " 3 In other words, the Supreme Court
will not simply defer to the President in national security matters when individual
liberties are at issue.
114
Finally, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 5 reaffirms the Court's enthusiasm for reviewing
the Executive Branch's conduct of national security affairs. The Hamdan opinion also
reveals the Court's willingness to undertake such a review despite congressional
110. See Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. 763,774 (1950) ("Executive power over enemy
aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history,
essential to war-time security.").
111. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)
(confirming the President's extensive power to conduct external relations). The majority wrote:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to
the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Id.
112. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,538-39 (2004) (recognizing the Due Process rights
of a U.S. citizen detained at Guantanamo Bay, including the right to present evidence before a
neutral decisionmaker during a habeas corpus hearing).
113. Id.at536.
114. Id.
115. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,2798 (2006) (rejecting the use of a military
commission to try a foreign national detainee suspected of aiding terrorism). In Hamdan, the
Court first addressed whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 deprived the Court of
jurisdiction, and whether abstention would be appropriate to avoid interfering in an ongoing
military trial. Id. at 2762, 2769-70. Deciding these foregoing issues in the negative, the Court
then looked at the legality of the military commission: (a) whether the establishment of the
military commission was authorized by Congress; (b) whether a military commission established
to try only violations of the laws of war could hear a charge of conspiracy; (c) whether the
commission's procedures were in accord with the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and
(d) whether the commission satisfied the Geneva conventions. Id. at 2779, 2786, 2793. The
case was brought on behalf of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national held in custody at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id. at 2759. The Government charged Hamdan with participating in
Al Qaeda's conspiracies and planned to try him by military commission at Guantanamo. Id. at
2761. Ruling against the military commission on each of these three points, the Court
invalidated the Executive's plan to subject Hamdan to trial. Id. at 2798.
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roadblocks. 116  The Court in Hamdan considered the legitimacy of military
commissions established to try Guantanamo detainees.' 17 The resulting opinion takes
a constitutionally strict view of Executive authority in times of national emergency
"Exigency alone, of course, will notjustify the establishment and use of penal tribunals
not contemplated by [thejudicial provisions of] the Constitution unless some other part
of that document authorizes a response to the felt need.""' 8 The Hamdan opinion's
stem insistence on constitutional authorization derives from the Court's Civil War
jurisprudence, which condemned unchecked Executive power." 9
The resolution of the Hamdan merits is notable for both its substance and for
the fact of its existence. With the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Congress
arguably intended to prevent the Court from hearing Hamdan and cases like it.,
20
116. See id. at 2762-69 (concluding that congressional legislation did not deprive the
Court ofjurisdiction over the case).
117. See supra note 115 (describing the issues the Court considered).
118. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (citations omitted).
119. In Exparte Milligan, the majority wrote:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a
doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on
which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the
powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been
happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority ....
Certainly no part of judicial power of the country was conferred on [military
commissions] ....
Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 120-21 (1866).
120. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2742 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)) ("[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider.., an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.... ."). In debating the
Detainee Treatment Act, which was an amendment to the defense appropriations bill for that
year, the author referred to the Hamdan proceedings as justification:
There is another Supreme Court case dealing with the due process rights of
determining whether a person is an enemy combatant.... There was a stay by
Federal District Judge [sic], staying military commission trials. The DC Circuit
Court of Appeals overrode the lower court. That has gone up to the Supreme Court
right now.... So the purpose of this amendment... is for Congress to legitimize
what is going on at Guantanamo Bay about determining enemy combatant status,
legitimizing that review process by making some changes. If we would do that, I
am convinced the courts would welcome that involvement and a lot of this
litigation would end overnight.
151 CONG. REc. S 11,061-03, S 11,074 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham); see
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As a direct result ofj oint congressional and presidential action, Hamdan presented
the last habeas corpus issue that the Court was likely to hear out of Guantanamo
Bay.12' Nevertheless, the Hamdan opinion avoids all opportunities to equitably
abstain from reaching the merits in anticipation of either a more apposite procedural
posture in light of the Detainee Treatment Act 122 or a more conclusive resolution of
the military's process. 123 The Court's choice to use its last bullet to slay the
Guantanamo military commissions' system is further evidence of the Court's
determination to make its voice heard on national security matters.
The Hamdan decision, in concert with other Guantanamo opinions, represents
the logical conclusion of the assault on the deferential principle discussed in this
Part. A determination to discipline Executive authority, perhaps born in the shadow
of Korematsu, has found its fullest expression in the Judiciary's mounting power
over the sun-soaked prisons of Guantanamo Bay.124 If the Supreme Court is
also 151 CONG. REc. S1 2,777-02, S 12,796 (daily ed. Nov. 15,2005) (statement of Sen. Specter)
("Under the language of exclusive jurisdiction in the DC Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court would
not have jurisdiction to hear the Hamdan case.. . ."). Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.
Ct. 2749, 2766 n. 10 (2006) (arguing that the statements by Senators during debate, which
support the majority's interpretation that the statute does not apply to pending cases, carry more
weight than other Senators' statements, which were appended to the record after the measure
was passed), with id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority misapplies the
legislative history). Justice Scalia writes:
These statements were made when Members of Congress were fully aware that our
continuing jurisdiction over this very case was at issue. The question was divisive,
and floor statements made on both sides were undoubtedly opportunistic and
crafted solely for use in this very litigation.
Id.
121. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (2006) (responding to the
Government's argument that Congress had no reason to preserve habeas jurisdiction over
pending detainee cases if Congress's purpose was to strip the federal courts of the power to
decide those cases in the future). Justice Stevens seemingly concedes the premise (while
disputing the conclusion):
There is nothing absurd about a scheme under which pending habeas actions-
particularly those, like this one, that challenge the very legitimacy of the tribunals
whose judgments Congress would like to have reviewed-are preserved, and more
routine challenges to final decisions rendered by those tribunals are carefully
channeled to a particular court and through a particular lens of review.
Id.
122. See id. (arguing that Congress would prefer to see the legitimacy of the tribunals
reviewed in the Supreme Court rather than rely on a review in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, to which Congress had just given exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter).
123. See id. at 2769-72 (rejecting the Government's contention that the Court should await
the final outcome of the military's proceedings in accordance with its precedents).
124. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987-93 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that
the Military Commissions Act effectively withdraws habeas corpus rights from Guantanamo
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determined to confront the President wherever his national security activities collide
with individual liberties, it follows that the reclassification authority cannot be
applied to individual citizens without inviting judicial scrutiny. Judicial skepticism
is likely to be intensified by the sense, discussed above, that the Executive's
classification system is of minimal importance to Congress's scheme for protecting
sensitive national security information. 
125
V. The (Vexing and Inscrutable) Meaning of"Reasonable" Government
Conduct in National Security Affairs
This Part examines the constitutionality of using the reclassification authority
contained in the Amended Order to physically recover information from private
individuals. The need to address this issue arises from the seemingly permissive
language emanating from the Executive Branch 26 and from "the fact routinely
accepted in all quarters that the Executive Branch abuses the power of
classification."'127 A collision of the reclassification power with individual liberties
will likely implicate the First and Fourth Amendments. Fortunately for the
Executive, exceptions abound to the fairly rigid doctrines of those two Amendments
which drain them of much of their practical force.
The Amended Order ostensibly gives the government the right to reclassify
information that was declassified but is "reasonably recoverable."' 2 8 Implicit in that
reclassification power is the authority to reach beyond the boundaries of the
Executive's classification system and seize information in order to bring it back
under the government's cloak of secrecy. 129 Sometimes, as with the National
detainees without violating the Constitution's Suspension Clause).
125. See supra Part III.C (discussing Congress's legislative scheme for protecting sensitive
information).
126. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the Amended Order and the ISOO guidance on it
both seem to tolerate the use of the reclassification authority against private citizens).
127. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 50, at 1066 (discussing the Executive's classification
power in the course of arguing that improper classification should be a defense to one of the
disclosure laws).
128. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,318 ("Information may be reclassified after
declassification and release to the public under proper authority only in accordance with the
following conditions ... (2) the information may be reasonably recovered.... ." (emphasis
added)).
129. See 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(a)(1)(i) (2006) (defining reasonably recoverable information,
in part, as meeting the following condition: "Most individual recipients or holders are known
and can be contacted and all forms of the information to be reclassified can be retrieved from
them ... ").
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Archives matter, the reclassifying agency will be recovering its material from other
government agencies, in which case constitutional concerns are trivial.
130
Nevertheless, the ISOO guidance associated with the Amended Order explicitly
contemplates "retriev[ing]" information from "individual recipients or holders" as
well-a power which raises serious constitutional questions.1
31
Because the language of recovery' 32 and retrieval13 3 is unfamiliar in
discussions of government action against individual citizens, this Part invokes the
language of the First and Fourth Amendments to analyze the Amended Order.
134
An examination of how the reclassification power interacts with individual rights
will need to analogize the novel reclassification power to better understood powers
of government. The manner in which the reclassification authority is framed
indicates that the power to retrieve information from individuals within the United
States is functionally equivalent to the more familiar police powers of search and
seizure.' 35 Thus, a constitutional analysis of the reasonableness of a reclassification
action conducted against an individual will take most of its cues from the Court's
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
13 6
130. See supra Part I (providing a narrative of the National Archives matter).
131. See 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(a)(1)(i) (specifying that information can be retrieved from
individuals possessing it so long as most of them are known and can be reached); see also supra
Part II.B (discussing the ISOO guidance in more depth).
132. See Amended Order, supra note 12, at 15,318 (providing the substantive standard,
"reasonably recovered," by which to judge whether information that has been released to the
public may be reclassified).
133. See 32 C.F.R. § 2001.13(a)(1)(i) (explaining that "reasonably recoverable" means that
most of the individual recipients and holders of the information are known, can be contacted,
and the information can be retrieved from them).
134. See supra Parts I, II.A (discussing the absence of a "reasonably recovered" standard in
any other area of federal law and the limited public record of reclassification actions).
135. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Executive Branch's conception of the
reclassification authority).
136. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (holding that administrative
searches that intrude significantly on the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment must be
accompanied by a warrant procedure, and that such a procedure must be governed by the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness but not necessarily by the probable cause
requirements which apply to criminal investigations); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(establishing the rights in question). The Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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Further, there is another constitutional interest at stake, as the majority
recognized in United States v. US. District Court:'37 "National security cases,
moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not
present in cases of ordinary crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive
may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally
protected speech."'138 Because the exercise of the police power to safeguard the
national interest is often bound up with political and expressive issues, constitutional
analysis of the reclassification authority will also necessarily implicate the values of
the First Amendment. 39 An extended discussion of how the Court has approached
the concept of reasonableness in its Fourth Amendment cases, and especially in
those that deal with national security matters and the First Amendment, should
therefore provide a greater understanding of what sort of reclassification recoveries
the Court is likely to consider reasonable.
Subpart A of this Part addresses complications which may arise from the
application of traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to potential
reclassification activities. To that end, subpart A begins with an analysis of the
potential efficacy of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement as a check on
reclassification activity; it concludes with an analysis of how courts are likely to
address the reasonableness of a warrantless seizure for the purposes of
reclassification. Subpart B discusses the Court's reception of First Amendment
claims with national security implications.
A. Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment in a National Security Context
The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and concept of
reasonableness, 140 which together guide criminal investigations, are unlikely to
translate into meaningful restraints on retrievals of information for reclassification.
The purely Executive character of reclassification activity precludes the
exclusionary rule, the traditional judicial enforcement mechanism for Fourth
Amendment violations, from discouraging overzealous conduct.14 1 Moreover, the
137. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 303-08 (1972) (finding
that the President is required to obtain a warrant when conducting domestic electronic
surveillance for national security purposes).
138. Id. at313.
139. See id. (discussing the nature of national security cases).
140. See infra Part V.A.2 (demonstrating that Fourth Amendment reasonableness, as
conceived by the Supreme Court, bears only a passing relationship to the layperson's
understanding of that term).
141. See infra Part V.A. 1 (analyzing the exclusionary rule's extremely limited persuasive
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wan-ant requirement, drained of practical force by copious judicially crafted
exceptions, is unlikely to meaningfully restrain reclassification actions. 142 Finally,
the gravity of the asserted interests at stake in national security affairs arguably could
render any executive policy reasonable, negating the force of the reasonableness
requirement as it applies to reclassification.
143
1. The Exclusionary Rule
National security operations frustrate the ordinary mechanisms of the judicial
process because the government's activities in national security affairs are not
geared toward criminal prosecution.' 44 Ordinarily the government's leeway in its
investigative activities is constrained by the strictures of the exclusionary rule:
Improperly gathered evidence is excluded from judicial proceedings. 145 The rule
punishes overly aggressive, or otherwise illicit, information-gathering by making it
harder for prosecutors to build their case. 146 In national security activities, the
government seeks information for proprietary use by Executive Branch officials,
meaning that the exclusion of improperly acquired information from future judicial
proceedings may not provide any disincentive. 147 Because the presumptive purpose
of any reclassification activity would be to halt and reverse the dissemination of a
piece of information, the irrelevant consequences of the exclusionary rule would not
act as a check on abusive activity.
force outside of the trial context).
142. See infra Part V.A.2 (describing the evolution and criticism of the extensive
exceptions to the warrant requirement).
143. See infra Part V.A.3 (evaluating the likely force of a reasonableness requirement in
efforts to protect the nation's security).
144. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972) ("We
recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical
considerations from the surveillance of ordinary crime.... [T]he emphasis of domestic
intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the
government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency.").
145. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to
state courts as well as federal courts).
146. See id. at 648 (describing the exclusionary rule as the principle that evidence gained in
violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights could not be used against that individual).
147. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[E]ven the risk of exclusion of
tainted evidence would here appear to be of negligible deterrent value inasmuch as the United
States frankly concedes that the primary purpose of these searches is to fortify its intelligence
collage rather than to accumulate evidence to support indictments and convictions.").
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2. The Warrant Requirement
One potential check on government authority to reasonably recover
information from individuals for the purposes of reclassification would be to judge
the reasonableness of a proposed information recovery through some form of the
warrant process contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.148 The potential check of
a warrant process for reclassification, however, is complicated by the lack of a clear
rule in the Court's opinions dictating when the procurement of a warrant is required
and when a government search or seizure may be constitutionally reasonable
without a warrant. The Court has stated a basic rule that warrantless searches "are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions." 149 Nevertheless, some opinions have
argued that "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable."150 Other majority opinions take a
nearly opposite view:
The warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for
decades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts
all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow "weighed"
against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working
part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check
148. Cf Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (discussing the warrant requirement as an
important procedural check on government authority to make an arrest, which is analogous to
the authority to seize information). The majority writes: "An arrest without a warrant bypasses
the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes
instead the far less reliable procedure on an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search,
too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Id.
149. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
150. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). The majority also stated that:
"A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may
be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this
requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search." Id. at
65. By contrast, Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argued:
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to assure that the existence of probable
cause as the legal basis for making a search was to be determined by a judicial
officer before arrest and not after, subject only to what is necessarily to be excepted
from such requirement. The exceptions cannot be enthroned into the rule. The
justification for intrusion into a man's privacy was to be determined by a magistrate
uninfluenced by what may turn out to be a successful search for papers, the desire
to search for which might be the very reason for the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition.
Id. at 80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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the "well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers" who are a
part of any system of law enforcement.' 51
To be sure, the idea that warrants are required largely prevails in a rhetorical sense.
Nevertheless, the Court's jurisprudence provides exceptions to the requirement that
degrade its practical force. 52 Justice Scalia ably summarizes this situation:
By the late 1960's, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least
rhetorically....
The victory was illusory. Even before today's decision, the "warrant
requirement" had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically
unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged nearly 20 such
exceptions, including "searches incident to arrest... automobile searches...
border searches... administrative searches of regulated businesses... exigent
circumstances ... searches incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to
arrest... boat boarding for document checks.. . welfare searches... inventory
searches... airport searches... school searches.... " Since then, we have
added at least two more. Our intricate body of law regarding "reasonable
expectation of privacy" has been developed largely as a means of creating these
exceptions, enabling a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment
"search" and therefore not subject to the general warrant requirement.15 3
The practical implications of this complicated jurisprudence for reclassification are
clear. On one hand, if the warrant requirement is adhered to, the government will
have to obtain advance judicial approval of the reasonableness of its actions, and it
will have to act under the significant constraints of longstanding rules for seizure
warrants. Courts have long held that valid seizure warrants "shall particularly
151. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
152. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468,
1473-80 (1985) (suggesting that the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence on the warrant requirement
creates exceptions that practically swallow the rule). Professor Bradley writes:
As anyone who has worked in the criminal justice system knows, searches
conducted pursuant to these [warrant requirement] exceptions, particularly searches
incident to arrest, automobile and "stop and frisk" searches, far exceed searches
performed pursuant to warrants. The reason that all of these exceptions have grown
up is simple: the clear rule that warrants are required is unworkable and to enforce
it would lead to exclusion of evidence in many cases where the police activity was
essentially reasonable.
Id. at 1475.
153. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted) (quoting Bradley, supra note 152, at 1473-74). See generally, Charles W. Chotvacs,
The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: Constitutional Protection or Legal Fiction?
Noted Exceptions Recognized by the Tenth Circuit, 79 DENV. U. L. REv. 331 (2002) (describing
extensive warrant requirement exceptions recognized in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals).
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describe the things to be seized"' 54 in order to render "general searches under
[seizure warrants] impossible and prevent[] the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another."' 55 Under a seizure warrant, with regard "to what is taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."' 5 6 On the other
hand, if the warrant requirement does not apply or is ignored, the government-
freed of the seizure warrant rules--can be confident of having the operational
latitude to recover all the information it seeks. Further, in case there is a legal
dispute, the government can hope to take advantage of the relatively magnanimous
attitude of the judiciary toward crafting exceptions to the rigors of the warrant
requirement.157
3. "Special Needs" and Warrantless, Reasonable Seizures
The erosion of the warrant requirement has prompted the Supreme Court to
frame a model of the Fourth Amendment with the Reasonableness Clause at its
core. Professor Scott Sundby writes: "The Court announced that if the government
154. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); accord Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476,485 (1965) ("[T]he constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly describe
the 'thing to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things' are
books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain.") and Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) ("General warrants... are prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment."); see generally Note, The Warrant Requirement, 32 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRiM.
PROC. 18 (2003) (describing the current features of the warrant requirement).
155. Marron, 275 U.S. at 196.
156. Id.
157. See Bradley, supra note 152, at 1470 (describing the Court's accommodating view of
seemingly reasonable police action). Professor Bradley writes:
[T]he Court is loathe to declare searches unconstitutional, with the concomitant
evidentiary exclusion, in cases where the police have essentially acted reasonably,
even if they have not exactly conformed to existing Supreme Court doctrine. The
result is that the Court strives to justify such police behavior by stretching existing
doctrine to accommodate it.
Id.; see also supra note 150 and accompanying quotation (describing the appropriate Fourth
Amendment test as whether the search was reasonable and not whether it would have been
reasonable to get a warrant). Compare Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-53 (1925)
(holding that moving vehicles stopped incident to arrest can be searched without a warrant
because the potential that the vehicle may be rapidly moved outside the jurisdiction presents an
exigent circumstance), with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49-52 (1970) (holding that a
vehicle held in government possession at a police station following an arrest could also be
searched without a warrant because the justifying exigent circumstance described in Carroll had
existed in the past and the challenged search presented a "lesser intrusion" on the suspect's
Fourth Amendment interest).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1115 (2007)
could show 'special needs' other than crime detection, then suspicionless
searches would be permissible if the government's justification
outweighed the intrusion on the privacy interest."'158 That analysis, which
was first fully annunciated in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab,159 controls the Court's conclusion about the reasonableness of the
disputed action.160 The reclassification power, if used to justify a search
or seizure, would seem to implicate a Von Raab analysis because it
operates outside the context of criminal investigation.'16  The court has
made clear that a Von Raab analysis does not depend on the particular
facts in the challenged situation, but rather on the reasonableness of the
government's overarching objective.162 A judge reviewing a challenged
158. Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He is Quiet": Suspicionless Searches,
"Special Needs" and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 511 (2004).
159. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(approving the suspicionless drug testing of some Customs Service employees). The majority in
Von Raab wrote:
In particular, the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in analyzing
the reasonableness of routine administrative functions, especially where the
Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to detect
violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for searching any particular place
or person.... Our precedents have settled that, in certain limited circumstances, the
Government's need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their
development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed
by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion....
We think the Government's need to conduct the suspicionless searches required by
the Customs program outweighs the privacy interests of employees engaged
directly in drug interdiction, and of those who otherwise are required to carry
firearms.
Id. (citations omitted).
160. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,573 (1991) (holding that the exception
to the warrant requirement for searches of moving vehicles must be extended to discrete closed
containers found within a vehicle); see also Sundby, supra note 158, at 503 (discussing the
Court's emphasis on privacy as "the centerpiece of the [Fourth] Amendment's protections"). In
light of the Court's decisions in Katz and Camara, Professor Sundby writes: "[Weighing...
the government's need for the intrusion against the severity of the intrusion on the individual's
privacy interest made logical sense." Id.
161. See supra Part V.A. 1 (discussing the minimal relevance of the exclusionary rule to the
non-judicial motives of reclassification).
162. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (upholding a
suspicionless program of drug testing for railroad employees). The majority in Skinner holds:
We conclude that the compelling Government interests... would be significantly
hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee. In view of
our conclusion that, on the present record, the toxicological testing contemplated
by the regulations is not an undue infringement on the justifiable expectations of
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reclassification activity, therefore, would have to decide the case as a policy matter,
answering whether the government's need for a reclassification program
outweighed the level of intrusion on the citizen.
1 63
The application of this method of judgment to national security matters is
complicated by the changing nature of reasonableness as one's analytical focus
moves away from criminal investigations to the defense of the nation, a more
perilous area of government activity.' 64 Because the judicial inquiry into
reasonableness is policy based and not fact based, 65 the abstract peril that national
security policy purports to address could drastically skew the reasonableness inquiry
in the reclassification program's favor. When acting in the interest of national
security, the government can claim that it is facing down lethal, and often
existential, threats to itself and to the populace. 66 In the face of such grave
consequences, almost any policy adopted to protect the people's collective security
could be characterized as reasonable.
The foregoing arguments for the reasonableness of the reclassification policy
would contend with arguments that the interest the policy protects is fairly trivial. The
latter arguments might draw substantial strength from Congress's apparently paltry
privacy of covered employees, the Government's compelling interests outweigh
privacy concerns.
Id.
163. See Sundby, supra note 158, at 512-13 (explaining how the decline of the warrant-
preference model led the Court to move away from factual inquiry and towards a policy inquiry
in determining the reasonableness of an intrusive government program).
164. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,538 (1985) ("Consistently,
therefore, with Congress's power to protect the Nation by stopping and examining persons
entering this country, the Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively
different at the international border than in the interior."). The qualitative difference in the
balance of reasonableness when the government is acting to protect the nation would likely
apply to reclassification actions, which would also be premised on national security. See supra
Part III.A (discussing the national security justifications for the classified system).
165. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text (discussing the policy emphasis of a
Von Raab special needs analysis).
166. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (July 4,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO6/O7/2O060704.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2007) (describing the stakes of the Iraq war and the war on terror) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). The President said:
We're engaged in a global struggle against the followers of a murderous ideology
that despises freedom and crushes all dissent, and has territorial ambitions and
pursues totalitarian aims. This enemy attacked us in our homeland on September
the 11 th, 2001. They're pursuing weapons of mass destruction that would allow
them to deliver even more catastrophic destruction to our country and our friends
and allies across the world. They're dangerous.
64 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1115 (2007)
regard for the integrity of the classified system 167 and from the extreme novelty of the
reclassification power itself, following a long period of prohibition.
68
The stakes of the judicial inquiry into the reasonableness ofreclassification policy
are high: The Judiciary's recognition of reclassification policy's reasonableness could
serve to immunize abusive applications of that policy against judicial scrutiny. 169 By
contrast, the Judiciary's denial of the reasonableness of reclassification policy might
deprive the Executive of the authority to recover sensitive infonmation from individual
citizens, potentially imperiling the nation's security in a case of extreme contingency.
Because ofthe stakes, it is reasonable to speculate that the outcome of a future inquiry
into the reasonableness of reclassification policy will (perversely) depend on the
particular facts underlying the dispute. Ifthe challenged reclassification clearly averted
a significant national danger, it seems likely that a court would endorse-or at least
defer to-the Executive's contention that reclassification policy is reasonable because
the nation's security interest trumps the Fourth Amendment. By contrast, if the
challenged reclassification was clearly abusive behavior that resulted in a negligible
security benefit, it seems equally likely that a court would judge the reclassification
policy over-inclusive and unreasonably intrusive upon Fourth Amendment interests.
As a result, the outcome of a Von Raab inquiry into the reasonableness of
reclassification policy is fundamentally uncertain and therefore unreliable as a
guarantee of individuals' rights under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Reasonableness and the First Amendment in a National Security Context
After a brief examination of the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions,
this subpart concludes that the Court is generally unwilling to interfere with the
protection of national security on the basis of a free speech claim. A full consideration
of the First Amendment implications of reclassification is beyond the scope of this
Note. Nevertheless, the foregoing Fourth Amendment analysis would not be complete
167. See supra Part II1'C (concluding that Congress's exclusion of classified status from much
of the law on disclosure of sensitive information reflected a minimal respect for the Executive's
classification system).
168. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (noting that reclassification was forbidden
by executive order until March of 2003).
169. See supra note 163 (noting that the determination of a Von Raab reasonableness inquiry
turns on the contested policy and not the particular facts of the case); see also supra note 8 and
accompanying quotation (recording, in a number of instances of potential abuse, how the CIA
withdrew extremely old unclassified documents from NARA because copies of them had once been
given to long-dead CIA officials).
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without some consideration of how an executive seizure of information interacts with
expressive rights.
The First Amendment regulates government search and seizure efforts, like
reclassification, that target information in order to suppress it. Justice Brennan once
wrote:
The use by government of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a
system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new. Historically
the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was bound up with the
issue of the scope of the search and seizure power.
Despite its historical underpinnings, the First Amendment's protection of expressive
freedom has not been a dependable check on government action that is undertaken to
protect national security. The clear rule previously discussed in the Pentagon Papers
case,"' which held that the Executive could not enjoin the publication of a classified
study of Vietnam war policy, is steadily contradicted by a line of cases, historical and
modem, which subordinate First Amendment interests to national security.
National security trumps free speech in Haig v. Agee, 1 2 in which the Supreme
Court upheld the Executive's authority to restrict the travel-and by extension, the
170. Marcus v. Search Warrants of 104 E. Tenth St., 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961).
171. See supra Part IV.A (describing the diverse opinions in Pentagon Papers in the context
of a discussion of deference to the Executive).
172. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-10 (1981) (holding that the Government's
legitimate interest in protecting the national security and foreign relations of the United States
trump the free speech rights of a disgruntled former intelligence officer). The Haig litigation
resulted from the government's attempt to deal with an intransigent former spy who was
endangering the lives of American intelligence personnel and undermining intelligence operations
by publicly revealing classified information (including the identities of intelligence officers). Id at
283-85. In response to continuing, damaging disclosures, the Secretary of State revoked the
passport of the rogue spy, Agee, and delivered an explanatory notice to him-claiming as his
authority a federal statute and accompanying regulation which seemed to grant the Secretary the
right to revoke passports to protect the national security. Id. at 286. Agee immediately sued on
First and Fifth Amendment grounds, claiming the government had violated his due process rights,
infringed his right to travel, and stifled his right to express dissent. Id. at 287. The Court first
decided affirmatively the narrow question of whether the Secretary had the asserted statutory
authorization to revoke a passport for national security purposes. Id. at 289-305. Proceeding to
Agee's constitutional claims, the Court found them entirely without merit. Id. at 306-10. With
regard to the right to travel, the Court distinguished between the robust right to interstate travel (a
virtually unqualified right) and much less extensive right to international travel (which can be
regulated within the bounds of due process), and found no violation. Id. at 307-08. With regard to
Agee's right of free expression, the Court found no constitutional protection for speech with the
declared purpose of interfering with the conduct of intelligence. Id. at 308-09. The Court further
wrote, "[t]o the extent the revocation of his passport operates to inhibit Agee, it is an inhibition of
action, rather than speech." Id. at 309. Finally, the Court briskly concluded that Agee had all the
due process he was entitled to. Id. at 309-10.
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speech-of an intransigent former intelligence officer. 173 Haig presented a particularly
dismal set of facts for the protection of the former intelligence officer's free speech
rights--he had used those rights to expose and endanger CIA officers.
174
Accordingly, the majority took a dim view ofthe First Amendment protections which
Agee claimed:
[R]epeated disclosures of intelligence operations and names of intelligence
personnel... are clearly not protected by the Constitution. The mere fict that
Agee is also engaged in criticism of the Government does not render his conduct
beyond the reach of the law. 7'
In reaching the conclusion that the protection of national security trumped First
Amendment interests in some cases, the Court approvingly recalled some earlier dicta,
from Near v. Minnesota,176 which could be seen as authorizing a far reaching
reclassification power.177 In that holding, the Court deprecated constitutional checks
173. See id. at 308-10 (dismissing Agee's First Amendment claims).
174. See id. at 284-85 (discussing Agee's declared purpose to expose the cover of CIA
officers). The majority recounts:
Agee and his collaborators have repeatedly and publicly identified individuals and
organizations located in foreign countries as undercover CIA agents, employees, or
sources. The record reveals that the identifications divulge classified information,
violate Agee's express contract not to make any public statements about Agency
matters without prior clearance by the Agency, have prejudiced the ability of the
United States to obtain intelligence, and have been followed by episodes of violence
against the persons and organizations identified.
Id. Interestingly, it was Agee's conduct that prompted Congress to pass the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act. See INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIESPROTECnONACTOF 1982, S. REP. No. 97-201, at 151
(1981) (explaining that Agee's conduct was a principal motive for the legislation); see also supra
note 61 (relating the legislation's strict requirements and its reliance on the classified system).
175. Haig, 453 U.S. at 308-09. But see id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning the
breadth of the majority's First Amendment holding); Brennan writes:
I suspect that this case is a prime example of the adage that "bad facts make bad law."
Philip Agee is hardly a model representative of our Nation. And the Executive Branch
has attempted to use one of the only means at its disposal, revocation of a passport, to
stop respondent's damaging statements. But just as the Constitution protects both
popular and unpopular speech, it likewise protects both popular and unpopular
travelers. And it is important to remember that this decision applies not only to Philip
Agee, whose activities could be perceived as harming the national security, but also to
other citizens who may merely disagree with Government foreign policy and express
their views.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (holding, by analogy to national
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on the Executive's power to recover national security information: "No one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting
service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location
of troops. 1 7 8 The foregoing language of restriction recalls another, older holding in
Schenck v. United States, 79 which seemed to authorize the government to make
sweeping restrictions on speech in the name of national security:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent It is
a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.'"°
The interests of a nation at war trump the expressive interests of its citizens.
From these opinions, it is reasonable to assert that the Court has a substantial
history of tolerating national security motivated restrictions on speech. Even in
Pentagon Papers, a number of Justices openly speculated in dicta that, even though
injunction ofpublication was not permissible, newspapers might be prosecuted under
the Espionage Act for revealing state secrets.' This history arguably determined the
outcome of the controversial decision in United States v. Rosen,82 a recent lower court
case which upheld, against a First Amendment challenge, the Espionage Act
prosecution of two private individuals who had allegedly obtained and disseminated
classified information.'83 Surprisingly, the court in Rosen relies heavily on Pentagon
Papers to uphold its restriction on speech.' 84 This line of reasoning immediately
elicited withering criticism:
178. Id. (dictum).
179. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919) (upholding the prosecution, under
the Espionage Act, of the author of a pamphlet which encouraged opposition to the World War I
draft).
180. Id.
181. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 744 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (analyzing Justice Marshall's
suggestions for the Government).
182. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 643 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing the
First Amendment claims of two Israeli-American lobbyists charged with Espionage Act violations
for disseminating classified information).
183. See id. at 638 (discussing the dicta in Pentagon Papers as persuasive evidence that
prosecutions of private individuals, under § 793(e) of the Espionage Act, for publishing previously
secret defense information are constitutional).
184. See id. at 639 ("[T]hus, the Supreme Court's discussion of § 793(e) in the Pentagon
Papers case supports the conclusion that § 793(e) does not offend the [C]onstitution.").
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By misconstruing precedent, the Rosen court reached the wrong result ...
Although the government undoubtedly has an interest in ensuring national
security-an interest that might sometimes entail prosecuting transmitters and
recipients of information whose behavior implicates the First Amendment--the
Espionage Act, as written, is an unconstitutional vehicle through which to pursue
such an interest.
185
While the Rosen court's reasoning may be open to question, its holding is clearly in
line with the Supreme Court's decisions, discussed above, which establish that the
First Amendment does not protect those who endanger national security.
In sum, the Supreme Court's treatment of First Amendment rights suggests that
the Court will accept aggressive govemment action to prevent disclosure of sensitive
national security information, even when that action infringes on the expressive rights
traditionally protected by the First Amendment. It is reasonable to expect the Court to
be similarly generous if that government action takes the form of reclassification.
V. Conclusion
Through the phenomenal power of a loosely drafted Executive Order, the
recently created reclassification authority arguably holds the potential to reach into the
lives and homes of individual citizens. Should that potential ever be realized, the
foregoing inquiries portend some unfavorable results for those hoping the Judicial
Branch will find some constitutional basis to protect them from Executive
reclassification efforts. The Supreme Court is certainly willing to exercise
constitutional review over the President's national security actions when those actions
collide with individual liberty. Nevertheless, the Court's decisions seem equally
willing to craft exceptions to First and Fourth Amendment doctrines in order to
approve seemingly reasonable Executive conduct and to avoid unduly interfering with
the defense of the nation.
185. Recent Case, United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006), 120 HARv.
L. REV. 821, 821 (2007).
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